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11.1  Introduction 
Although economists generally measure employees’ compensation by 
money wages, money wages account for a shrinking proportion of total 
employee compensation. In 1977 only 76.7 percent of  employee com- 
pensation in the private, nonfarm economy was in the form of  direct 
payment for time worked (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1980b, p. 8). 
Paid leave (vacations and holidays) accounted for 6.1 percent of  com- 
pensation, employer contributions to social security and other retirement 
programs for 8.5 percent, employer expenditures for life, accident, and 
health insurance, for 4  percent, and expenditures for sick leave, unem- 
ployment, and bonuses accounted for the remainder. Between 1966 and 
1977 nonwage compensation or fringe benefits grew at a faster rate than 
pay for time worked. 
In spite of  the importance of  fringe benefits, labor supply models 
typically treat only the wage portion of  compensation, while it is clear 
that total compensation is the relevant variable affecting labor supply. 
How much does this distort our conclusions? Clearly, if wages are only a 
part of labor compensation and, in fact, are negatively related to benefits, 
wages alone may be a very error-prone measure of  compensation. This 
would tend to bias toward zero the measured labor supply elasticities. 
We show below that at higher tax rates, employees desire a greater 
proportion  of  their  total income in the form of  nontaxable  benefits. 
Therefore, earnings functions which look at the wage portion of  com- 
pensation will underestimate the total earnings of  employees facing high 
marginal tax rates. Since more highly educated workers may face higher 
marginal tax rates, they may take a greater percentage of their remunera- 
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tion in the form of benefits. We would therefore underestimate the rate of 
return to schooling, because we measure a decreasing proportion of total 
compensation at higher wage levels. Earnings functions often show rates 
of return at high schooling levels which are low compared to market rates 
of  return on capital (Freeman  1977). This could result from the un- 
observed  returns in the form of  benefits. If  men and women receive 
different proportions of compensation in the form of benefits, we will also 
distort earnings comparisons between these groups. 
Clearly, measuring  the  effect  that  ignoring fringe  benefits has  on 
estimates of labor supply and earnings functions requires data on factors 
affecting individuals’ productivity and personal characteristics as well as 
on wages and fringe benefits. Some studies have considered how the 
amounts of  fringe benefits supplied by employers vary with industry or 
employer  but not employee characteristics (e.g, Goldstein and Pauly 
1976). A recent survey of health care coverage (Taylor and Lawson 1981) 
does contain the requisite demographic data but does not include in- 
formation on the employer’s payments for health insurance or other 
fringes. Data sets with both employee characteristics and employer fringe 
benefit payments can be constructed by linking data from separate em- 
ployer and employee surveys (e.g.,  Smeeding, this volume). By  using 
means, however, we lose the data on individual characteristics which 
would allow us to hold productivity constant. 
The present paper, instead of using establishment data, uses data on 
individuals which is supplemented by  employer reports of  those indi- 
viduals’ benefits. Data collected as part of  the Health Insurance Study 
(Newhouse 1974) are used to examine how the benefits received vary 
with employee  characteristics.  The HIS has cost data only for health 
insurance and vacation pay. It has data on individuals’ receipt of  other 
benefits,  but not  their value.  These values, conditional on receipt  of 
benefits, are estimated from the 1972 BLS survey of  firm compensation 
practices. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 11.2  presents a simple model 
of the division of compensation between wages and benefits. Section 11.3 
presents findings from the 1972 BLS survey. Section 11.4 describes the 
HIS data. Section 11.5.1 compares the HIS data with a large national 
sample. Section 11  S.2  shows how fringe benefits vary with full-time work 
status,  sex,  and race,  and also presents earnings function estimates. 
Section 11.6 gives conclusions and data recommendations. 
11.2  Trade-offs between Wages and Benefits 
11.2.1  Wage Benefit Trade-offs in Theory 
Consider a model of the labor market where remuneration for a given 
worker  consists not  only of  money wages, but  also of  benefits paid 373  Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation 
directly by the employer. Employers will be indifferent to the composi- 
tion of  total compensation between money wages and benefits. 
Employees have preferences between wages and benefits. Many ben- 
efits are characterized by their nonmarketability. They can only be con- 
sumed as a tie-in to employment, and they are not transferable-for 
example, an employee cannot resell his health insurance or accept bids 
for his sick leave. However, employees are free to choose employers 
whose benefit mix maxmimizes their utility. Thus, on-the-job benefits can 
be considered local public goods, and Tiebout-like, employees search out 
employers who have a benefit mix which “fits” their utility function (see 
Goldstein and Pauly 1976). Employers, too, will have an incentive to 
adjust their mix to the expected tastes of their potential employees. Thus, 
public school systems offer generous sick leave for their largely female 
work force, while universities offer free tuition to their education-minded 
employees. 
We distinguish three types of  benefits from the employee’s point of 
view. First, there are nontaxable substitutes for private  consumption 
expenditures (such as employer-financed health insurance or subsidized 
lunches in the company cafeteria). Second, there are taxable substitutes 
for private consumption which the employer can provide at low cost 
because of quantity discounts (such as life insurance). Third, there are 
“paid vacations” and sick leave which also are taxable. We assume that 
the employer is indifferent to the composition of benefits among the three 
types. 
Even from this cursory taxonomy of the on-the-job benefits it is evident 
why  some classes of  benefits exist: given positive marginal tax rates, 
employers can purchase nontaxable benefits which are worth more to 
their employees than an equivalent expenditure on wages. 
It can be shown (see Leibowitz 1982) that the greater the marginal tax 
rate, the lower the effective price of  benefits. Thus, nontaxable benefits 
are most valuable to the highest wage employees. Further, because of 
group rates, employers may effect economies of scale in providing even 
taxable benefits. Sick leave is a kind of  disability insurance where the 
employer self-insures. Typically, for extended sick leave the employer 
reinsures with a commercial agency or relies on government coverage. 
Vacation as a fringe benefit is harder to understand since providing “paid 
vacation” is equivalent  to providing a wage increase.  Perhaps “paid 
vacation” is more of a benefit for the employer than the employee since it 
is a mechanism whereby employers limit the amount of  unscheduled 
unpaid leave employees can take. 
11.2.2  Wage-Benefit Trade-offs in Practice 
Ceteris paribus, there should be a negative relationship between wages 
and benefits. The problem for estimation is to hold productivity constant 
in  practice.  Establishment data, such as have been used  in previous 374  Arleen Leibowitz 
studies, have only the crudest indicators of productivity-production  or 
white-collar worker, union status, and type of industry. With such data, 
one is likely to pick  up  changes in benefits across levels of  worker 
productivity,  rather than trade-offs between wages and benefits for a 
given employee. For this reason, it is not possible to obtain a meaningful 
hedonic benefits function from this type of  data. 
With disaggregated data on individuals, it is possible to control suf- 
ficiently for productivity that a wage benefit trade-off could be observed. 
Then wages and benefits should be negatively related. However, if there 
are unobserved factors affecting productivity, it is no longer true that 
observed wages and benefits will be negatively correlated since benefits 
may be related to the unobserved productivity factors, which shift the 
entire wage-benefit locus. 
If  benefits accounted for the same share of remuneration at all produc- 
tivity levels, rate of return calculations would not be affected by not fully 
controlling for productivity. Since we expect higher proportions of ben- 
efits at higher tax brackets, the expansion path may veer toward benefits 
as wages increase. However, at some point, the demand for benefits may 
become saturated, as the marginal utility of benefits falls to zero. Govern- 
ment regulations may also limit the amount of benefits an employee can 
receive with favored tax treatment. 
In this paper we can provide some evidence about the bias resulting 
from the omission of fringe benefits in computing the increase in earnings 
due to additional schooling and  in  comparing earnings  of  men  and 
women. There are insufficient numbers of  blacks in the sample to make 
meaningful racial comparisons. 
In the next section, findings  from a 1972  BLS survey are presented. The 
following two sections describe the HIS data base and present some 
empirical estimates. 
11.3  Fringes and Wages in a National Sample 
A 1972 BLS survey of  firm compensation practices provides data on 
employers’ expenditures for various categories of benefits and for wages 
(U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1975). The survey, a stratified probabil- 
ity sample of  establishments  covered by  state employment insurance 
laws, included 5031 firms. The strata are classified by industry, location, 
and number of employees, with the probability of inclusion in the sample 
roughly proportional to employment size. 
Table 11.1 presents data on averge hourly wages and benefits for office 
and nonoffice workers. The data are averages over the 4632 firms who 
reported complete information and have been weighted to be representa- 
tive of covered employees in these industries nationwide. The nominal 
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Table 11.1  Hourly Wages and Benefits of OtBce and Nonoffice Workers1972 
Correlation 
between 
Office  Nonoffice  Wage 
Workersb  and Ratio of  Workers" 
Compensation  $/hr  %  $/hr  %  Nominal Wage 
Nominal wage for working hours  4.94  82.9  3.18  84.4  - 
Vacation  .46  7.7  .17  4.5  .15 
Pension  .16  2.7  .06  1.6  .30 
Benefit to 
Social security  .20  3.4  .17  4.5  -.59 
Unemployment  .08  1.3  .12  3.2  -.22 
Insurance  .12  2.0  .07  1.9  .15 
Total compensation  5.96  -  3.77  -  .15 
Source:  Calculated from U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics (1975). 
"Office workers are defined as: all employees in executive, administrative, and management 
positions above the working supervisory  level; supervisory  and nonsupervisory professional 
employees and their technical assistants; office clerical workers; salespersons whose sales 
activities are primarily performed outside the establishment (e.g., real estate salesmen, 
door-to-door salesmen). 
bNonoffice  workers are defined as: all employees, except office employees, in nonsupervi- 
sory, nonprofessional positions, including employees engaged in fabricating, processing, 
assembling, building, mining, repairing,  warehousing, trucking, retail  sales, etc.  Pro- 
prietors, members of  unincorporated firms, and unpaid family workers are excluded from 
the survey. 
that is, direct payments for hours worked. It includes payments for shift 
differentials but does not include overtime pay. Wage rates were calcu- 
lated by dividing employer expenditures for time worked by the number 
of  hours worked. 
Hourly benefits were calculated by dividing each employer's expendi- 
tures on benefits by the number of hours worked. Employer payments for 
health, life, and accident insurance accounted for 2.0 percent of  office 
employees' total compensation, and 1.9 percent for nonoffice employees. 
Including vacation  pay, pensions,  insurance, and social security pay- 
ments, office workers gained, on average, $1.02 per hour and nonoffice 
workers, $.59 per hour from the various fringe benefits. 
In spite of  the substantial increase in compensation per hour repre- 
sented by fringe benefits, the correlation of total compensation (wages 
plus fringes) with base wage rate is 0.98. However, as wages increase, 
fringe benefits grow as a fraction of  total compensation, as seen by the 
positive  correlation  between  wages  and percentage of  compensation 
accounted for by fringe benefits. The last column shows the correlation 
across firms in the 1972 BLS survey of  nominal wages with the ratio of 
fringe benefits to nominal wages. Over all, there is a low positive correla- 
tion (0.15) between base wage rates and the share of  fringe benefits in 
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As postulated above, benefits increase as a share of total compensation 
at higher productivity levels. However, it appears that nontaxable as well 
as taxable benefits increase with productivity. The share of  nontaxable, 
private pensions, in total compensation, is more highly correlated with 
wages (0.30) than the share of taxable leave time (vacation, holidays, sick 
leave, and personal leave). Both leave time’s share and that of insurance 
benefits are correlated 0.15 with nominal wages. Benefits mandated by 
law, such as employer contributions to social security and unemployment 
insurance, account for a smaller share of wages at higher compensation 
levels, largely because there is a ceiling on the income subject to em- 
ployer and employee taxes. In general, however, benefits represent a 
larger share of  compensation at higher wage levels. To see whether this 
leads to underestimates of  rates of  return, we  turn to data from the 
Health Insurance Study. 
11.4  The Health Insurance Study 
Data for this section were collected by  the Health Insurance Study 
(HIS) which is being carried out under a grant from the Department of 
Health and Human Services (previously Health, Education, and Wel- 
fare) to The Rand Corporation. The purpose of  the HIS is to address 
questions of health care financing by experimentally enrolling families in 
a variety of health insurance plans which vary in the amount they reim- 
burse families for medical expenditures, and monitoring their subsequent 
health and health-care expenditures. (The study design is described in 
Newhouse [1974].) As part of  this effort, data on wages, income, and 
fringe benefits were also collected. Beginning in 1974, a total sample of 
7706 individuals in 2756 families have been enrolled at six sites: Dayton, 
Ohio; Seattle, Washington; Fitchburg, Massachusetts; Franklin County, 
Massachusetts; Charleston, South Carolina; and Georgetown County, 
South Carolina. Participants were enrolled for a period of  either three 
years or five years. Early results on the response of medical expenditures 
to variation in reimbursement are reported in Newhouse et al. (1981). 
Eligibility for participants is quite broad. The only ineligible people are 
those 62 years of age and older at the time of  enrollment, and persons 
with special health-care options such as members of the military, persons 
in prisons,  recipients  of  disability medicare  or veterans with  service 
connected disabilities. In addition, low-income families were  slightly 
oversampled,  and those with  incomes in  excess of  $25,000 (in  1973 
dollars) were not eligible. Families in the experiment are representative 
of  families in their site, although because of  the income restriction, they 
do not represent a random sample. The sample as a whole is not a random 
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rural northern, southern, and western sites. This allows estimation of 
regional and city-size effects. 
Over the life of  the study, data are collected on demographic and 
economic variables, health status, utilization of  health services, type of 
health services received, and type of  providers utilized. Demographic 
and economic data are elicited at baseline interviews prior to actual 
enrollment. 
Income data are updated annually, when respondents are asked to 
copy from their income tax forms information  on earnings, interest, 
dividends, federal, state, and local taxes paid, tax credits, and nontaxable 
income. From these data, marginal tax rates are calculated. Wage and 
labor supply data  are updated  at four- to six-month intervals.  Each 
person over age 16 fills in a mailed questionnaire with employment data. 
A flexible format allows respondents to report hourly, daily, weekly, 
biweekly, monthly, or annual earnings. For this study all earnings were 
reduced to an hourly basis using data supplied in the same questionnaire 
on weekly hours of  work and weeks worked per year. Wage data were 
obtained for a primary and secondary job, but only the wage data for the 
first job are used in this paper. The periodic employment report also 
asked whether the respondent was eligible at his first job for “employer- 
paid  accident  insurance”  and  “employer-paid  life  insurance.”  “Em- 
ployer-paid’’ was defined as insurance for which the employer paid any 
part. The amount of the premium paid on behalf of the employee is not 
known. 
Vacation and sick leave data were obtained directly from employers by 
means of the sick leave abstraction form. Employers were identified from 
the preceding  periodic employment  report.  Employers  reported  the 
number of  hours, days, or weeks of  vacation for which each of  their 
employees in the HIS was eligible. Employers supplied a great deal of 
detail about sick leave: whether it accrued with length of service, or was a 
fixed  amount  per illness or per  period of  time, or was given at the 
employer’s discretion. Whether the employee received full or partial pay 
for sick days, whether  benefits began on the first day of  illness, and 
whether sick leave could be accumulated were also determined.  Sick 
leave data were not obtained for persons who were self-employed, so 
they have been eliminated from this analysis. 
Vacation and sick leave plans were obtained from employers in 1978. 
Wage data corresponding to the same time period were obtained from 
periodic employment reports administered in March 1978  for Dayton and 
in September 1978 for the Seattle, Massachusetts, and South Carolina 
sites. 
Health insurance benefits could not be obtained for the identical time 
period because after enrollment all HIS subjects received their HIS- 378  Arleen Leibowitz 
assigned insurance package. Therefore, the health insurance measure 
relates to the benefits workers received before enrollment in the HIS. 
Because many workers had changed jobs in the several years between 
enrollment in the study and the time at which we obtained wage data, the 
available sample size was smaller for analyses using health insurance 
data. The sample was further reduced because data were only available 
for a subsample of employees. For those with data, the measure is the 
annual employer contribution to health insurance premiums, as reported 
by the employer. The HIS data base also contains detailed information 
on the provisions of health insurance held by employees in our study prior 
to their enrollment in the experimental HIS plans. Marquis (1981) de- 
scribes how these data were obtained by abstracting descriptive booklets 
provided  by  employers. She also finds that most  families were  well 
informed about some aspects of  their health insurance coverage, but 
many lacked detailed knowledge of  benefits covered. Some knowledge 
about the generosity  of  health insurance  coverage (and other fringe 
benefits) is essential if  employees are to effectively trade off benefits for 
money wages. 
11.5  Empirical Estimates 
11.5.1 
In order to assess the quality of  the HIS fringe benefits data, we begin 
by comparing fringe benefits data collected by the HIS in 1978 with the 
1979 Level of  Benefits (LOB) Survey (U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
1980~).  The  LOB  data were collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 
1979 as a pilot survey. The survey, conducted for the Office of Personnel 
Management, will be used to develop cost estimates for providing federal 
employees’ benefits comparable to those in private industry. 
While the LOB and HIS fringe benefits surveys occurred within a 
relatively short time span, the LOB sample differs in several ways from 
the HIS sample. The LOB obtained information from 1253 large estab- 
lishments  in  the continental United  States. Establishments  with few 
employees (the minimum number of employees varied between 50 and 
250, depending on the industry) were not surveyed. Responding estab- 
lishments were asked to provide benefits data for three classes of  work- 
ers: professional-administrative, technical-clerical, and production. The 
LOB survey excluded executive management employees and part-time, 
seasonal, and temporary employees. 
The HIS sample,  by  contrast, was defined as including employed 
individuals who were enrolled in the HIS, and therefore subject to its 
sampling rules. The data represent plans applicable for a given indi- 
vidual. No exclusions were made on the basis of  occupation, part-time 
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employment, or establishment size. The HIS data can be aggregated to 
the occupation categories in the LOB  for comparison. However, because 
of the noted differences between the two samples, the data obtained from 
the two sources may not correspond exactly. 
The benefit rates reported in the LOB tend to exceed the rates in the 
HIS because LOB excludes seasonal and temporary workers and smaller 
employers. The percentage of  employees covered by  life insurance is 
similar in the two surveys, but the percentage covered by health insur- 
ance is lower in the HIS. While LOB reports that 96 percent of full-time 
employees receive health insurance benefits, HIS data indicate 87 per- 
cent do so. The HIS number matches well with National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS) data which show 86-91  percent of workers in 
firms with health insurance plans. The same document shows that over 90 
percent of employees in firms with more than twenty-five workers have 
health insurance plans available, while only 55 percent of workers in firms 
with twenty-five or fewer employees do (Taylor and Lawson 1981, p. 4). 
The exclusion of  smaller employers and part-time workers causes the 
LOB estimates to exceed the average for all firms and workers. This is a 
probable explanation for the reported differences in paid vacation and 
sick leave. The HIS data seem to correspond well to national data, where 
the comparison group is similar, as in the NCHS survey. 
The multivariate analysis will use only data on full-time workers, but 
we can use the HIS data to determine how the various benefits vary with 
part-time/full-time status. Table 11.2 shows that fewer than half of  the 
HIS sample part-time employees receive each of the benefit types, except 
health insurance. The percent of the HIS sample of full-time employees 
Table 11.2  Benefits of Part-Time and Full-Time Employees 
Benefit 
Percent Receiving Benefit 
Part-Time  Full-Time 
HIS"  HISa  LOB 
Sick leave  36%*  47 %  56% 
Paid vacation  30%  *  56%  100% 
Accident insurance  43%*  79%  55%' 
Life insurance  31%*  73%  77 % 
Health insuranced  75%*  87%  96% 
(noncontributory) 
"HIS data from 1978 Sick leave Abstraction and Periodic Employment Reports (I11 for 
Dayton, IV for other sites), see Leibowitz (1982). 
hU.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics (1980a), table 1, p. 4. 
'Accident and sickness insurance, noncontributory. 
dHIS data based on a subsample at baseline. 
*Differences between HIS full- and part-time employees significant at the 0.001 level. 380  Arleen Leibowitz 
receiving benefits is nearly twice as high as for part-time in each category 
except sick leave and health insurance. 
Table 11.3 shows that even among full-time employees, benefits vary 
by  race and sex. The top panel shows what percentage of  employees 
received benefits of  various types. The bottom panel shows the wage 
increase implied by two types of  benefits. These two fringe benefits are 
the only ones where the HIS data have actual employer expenditures. 
Female employees were significantly more likely to receive paid sick 
leave and vacation than male employees, while men were more likely to 
receive both accident and life insurance. Male and female workers were 
equally likely to receive health insurance through their employment. 
Black-white differences should be interpreted with caution, since blacks 
accounted for only 4  percent of  the sample. Further, a majority of the 
blacks resided in South Carolina, where all workers have lower benefit 
levels. Given these interpretive caveats, the data show that white workers 
were more likely to receive sick leave, accident and life insurance, but no 
more likely to receive health insurance or paid vacation. 
The bottom panel of  table  11.3 shows the percentage increase  in 
compensation due to employer-paid health insurance premiums and due 
Table 11.3  Benefits of Full-Time Employees by Race and Sex 
~~  ~~ 
Benefit  White  Black  Male  Female 







Number of  observations 
(first four benefits) 
Number of  observations 
~  ~~  ~ 
47  34  40'  60 
57  44  53d  62 
81"  47  84'  70 
73"  53  79  68 
87  85  87  86 
856  32  587  301 
443  21  165  299 
(health insurance) 
Percentage Increase in Compensation due to Benefit 
*  4.5% 
Paid vacation  3.4  2.5  3.0%'  4.0% 
Paid vacation plus holidays  6.1"  5.0  5.5%'  7.2% 
Employer-paid health insurance  *  4.4% 
"Difference  between whites and blacks is significantly  different at 1%  level; however, these 
differences may be peculiar to our sample. 
bDifference  between whites and blacks is significantly  different at 10% level; however, these 
differences may be peculiar to our sample. 
'Difference between males and females is significantly different at 1% level. 
dDifference  between males and females is significantly different at 5% level. 
*Insufficient observations to compute. 381  Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation 
to paid vacation and holidays.’ For full-time workers in this sample, paid 
vacation added 3 percent to men’s salaries and 4 percent to women’s. 
Thus women were not only more likely to receive vacation, but also had a 
significantly greater share of compensation as vacation benefits. Includ- 
ing paid holidays makes the differences appear even larger, since even 
among full-time workers, men  have longer  average workweeks than 
women. These numbers correspond well to the 6.1 percent of compensa- 
tion attributable to vacations and holidays in 1977 reported by the BLS 
(19804. The percentage increase in wages attributable to health insur- 
ance, for those who had health insurance, is 4.4 percent for men and 4.5 
percent for women. When we allow for the fact that not all workers have 
health insurance benefits and that life and accident insurance premiums 
are likely to be small, this number is quite consistent with the 4 percent of 
employers’ expenditures for life, accident, and health insurance (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 1980b). Thus the HIS data are quite compara- 
ble to national averages. 
The differences by sex indicate that significant variation exists within 
the group of full-time employees. Table 11.3 shows that at least in terms 
of sick leave and vacation, women are more likely to receive benefits than 
men. To see whether this offsets some of the male-female differential in 
direct  monetary compensation, we must  use multivariate methods to 
control for productivity differences. Because of  the richness of  com- 
plementary data on wages and demographic characteristics, we should be 
able to determine to what extent employees trade off wages and benefits. 
11.5.2  Multivariate Analyses 
In this section hedonic wage functions are estimated. We expect a 
negative relationship between wages and benefits if  productivity is effec- 
tively held constant. A single method such as this does not capture the 
simultaneous nature  of  the wage-benefit trade-off. However, it  does 
solve a data problem posed by having employer costs for some benefits, 
but only a dichotomous indicator of  whether benefits were received for 
others. 
Table  11.4 presents  regressions  for the entire sample of  full-time 
workers (those who worked thirty-five hours or more a week) for whom 
wage and fringe benefits data referred to the same employer. Regressing 
the log of hourly earnings on the usual productivity measures, we find 
that the implied rate of  return to schooling is 4.1 percent. The rate of 
return estimate falls in the low end of the range reported in the literature. 
A consumer price indexZ  as well as dummy variables for the sites are 
included in the regression, but not shown. This regression accounts for 
one-quarter of the variance in log hourly earnings. 
Men’s median earnings were estimated to be 49 percent greater than 




Log of  before and 
Log  Log Hourly  after Tax  after Tax 
Vacation  Wage Plus  Wages Plus  Wages Plus 
Dependent Variable:  Log Hourly Wage  Days  Benefits  Benefits  Benefits 
All  All  All  All  All 
Full  Full  Full  Full  Full 
Time  Males  Females  Time  Time  Timeb  Time 
Sample:  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Independent Variables:” 
Intercept  1.098  1.482  .997  -  .330  1.114  1.004  .110 
Education (years)  .041  ,041  .043  .067  .043  ,038  .005 
Experience (years)  .009  .0154  -  ,003  .022  .021  .018  .003 
Experience squared  -  .006  -  ,017  .012  -  .023  -  .036  -  ,033  -  .003 
(years  x  lo-’)  ( -  .42)  (- .99)  (57)  (-.W  ( -  3.42)  (-3.20)  (- 1.54) 
Sex  .399  -  .081  .367  .370  -  .003 
(9.29)  (- .74)  (11.1)  (11.60)  (- .44) 
Union  .127  ,151  .058  -  ,272  ,146  .133  -  .013 
(2.73)  (2.65)  (.73)  (- 2.27)  (4.18)  (3.93)  (- 1.92) 
(7.94)  (9.35)  (4.59)  (- .96)  (10.3)  (9.61)  (5.17) 
(6.67)  (5.33)  (4.31)  (4.24)  (8.79)  (7.99)  (5.41) 
(1.48)  (2.07)  (- .31)  (1.50)  (4.44)  (3.95)  (3.15) 
RZ  .25  .17  .16  .07  .38  .36  .14 
Number of  observations  595  389  206  595  595  515  515 
’Prices and sites were also controlled in the regressions. 
bAfter tax regression has smaller sample because of  missing income tax forms. 383  Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation 
regressions for men and women had significantly different sets of  coef- 
ficients. (F  = 24.5 with 14  and 580 degrees of freedom.) While the rates of 
return were similar, men’s wages increased more with experience and 
were positively related to union membership, while women’s wages were 
not. 
A significant share of employees’ fringe benefits is in the form of paid 
vacation. What does “vacation earnings function” look like? Column (4) 
in table 11.4 shows how the log of vacation days is related to productivity 
determinants, just  as wages are. Vacation  days increase significantly 
more rapidly with education than do money wages,3  even though there is 
no tax advantage in receiving vacation pay. This result is consistent with 
the finding from the 1972 data reported in table 11.1. Union status is 
associated with shorter paid vacations, but higher wages. In contrast to 
the results for money wages, sex does not affect vacation benefits signifi- 
cantly, once experience and other factors are accounted for. 
How would the rate of  return to schooling be affected by  including 
compensation in the form of fringe benefits in total compensation? The 
wage data used in columns (1)-(3)  were augmented to account for the 
implicit increase due to vacation pay, for sick leave (based on the sex- 
adjusted average number of days lost from work due to sickness by men 
and women), and on  price-adjusted, occupation-specific  expenditures for 
health, life, and accident insurance, given that an individual received 
in~urance.~  Hourly wages, including vacation pay, sick leave, and insur- 
ance, averaged $6.70 compared to $6.25 before benefits were added, an 
increase of 7 percent. This increase falls within the range reported above 
for office and nonoffice workers. The earnings function explains a sub- 
stantially greater percent of  the variance of  wages plus benefits than of 
wages alone. 
If  a greater percentage of compensation is given in the form of benefits 
to workers with certain characteristics (those with more education or 
experience, for example), then earnings functions which excluded ben- 
efits would bias the coefficients of these variables. To see which charac- 
teristics would be significantly  biased by omitting benefits, the ratio of full 
compensation to wage compensation was regressed on the independent 
variables included in table 11.4. The results show that there is no system- 
atic relationship between the independent variables and the ratio of wage 
to wages plus benefits.  This is  equivalent  to stating that the sets of 
coefficients in columns 1  and 5 in table 11.4 differ only in the inter~ept.~ 
The benefits accounted for here are largely taxable, and the correla- 
tions using BLS data show these rise less rapidly with productivity than 
nontaxable benefits. However, it is clear that the omission of  taxable 
benefits from earnings functions does not lead to significant bias in rate of 
return  to schooling estimates,  or to male-female or union-nonunion 
comparisons. In column (6) of  table 11.4 the family marginal tax rate 384  Arleen Leibowitz 
(derived from data on actual income taxes paid) and social security tax 
rate are applied to wages to obtain an earnings function for after-tax 
wages plus benefits. 
The regression shows that accounting for taxes has a greater effect on 
the coefficients than including benefits. The ratio of before-tax wage plus 
benefits to after-tax wage plus benefits is significantly related to both 
education and labor market experience, as the last column shows, while 
we found no significant change in coefficients due to adding benefits to 
raw wages. The  positive coefficients  in column (7) indicate that the rate of 
return to schooling and experience appear to be significantly more posi- 
tive when marginal tax rates are ignored. The bias amounted to a differ- 
ence in the rate of return of 0.5 percent. The ratio of after-tax wage plus 
benefit to hourly wages (e.g., comparing columns 7 and 1) is not signifi- 
cantly related to either education or experience, since the positive effect 
of  schooling on benefits is counterbalanced by the positive relationship of 
schooling and marginal tax rates. 
Using this basic earnings function framework, we next estimate an 
hedonic wage function to determine in what way employees trade off 
wages for benefits. Table 11.5 presents hedonic wage equations in which 
benefits  are added to the basic earnings function.  If  employees  are 
trading off  wages for benefits, we expect these benefit variables to have 
negative signs. There are four dummy variables indicating whether or not 
benefits are received. Receipt of paid vacation, sick leave, and accident 
insurance is associated with lower wages, but only vacation benefits lower 
wages significantly. However, the receipt of  life insurance is positively 
related  to wages.  While  not  receiving any vacation  or sick leave  is 
compensated by higher wages, among those who do receive the benefit, 
wages are positively related to the amount of  benefit received. 
The LOB study gives a clue as to why this happens. Their data show 
that within occupation types, the number of vacation days and sick leave 
days increase with years of  service (U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 
1980a, pp. 5 and 6). But wages also increase with years of  service or 
experience. Borjas (1981) found that workers with greater employer- 
specific tenure had significantly higher wages at later ages. While the 
regression  controls for labor market experience, it does not perfectly 
control for years of service with a given employer. Thus the unobserved 
variable, years of  employer-specific experience, which is positively re- 
lated to both wages and vacation  and sick leave benefits, biases the 
continuous benefit coefficients. 
Separate regressions for men and women were found to differ sig- 
nificantly from each other.6  Both men’s and women’s wages react simi- 
larly to vacation benefits, but they differ in the response to sick leave. 
Sick leave has little effect on men’s wages. For women, however, receiv- 
ing any sick leave is compensated by lower wages, but among women who 385  Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation 
Table 11.5  Hedonic Wage Equations for Full-Time Workers 
(&values  in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable: Log Hourly Wage 
Sample 
All  Full-  Full-  with 
Full-  Time  Time  Health 
Independent Variables"  Time  Males  Females  Insurance 
Education 
Receives vacation 
Receives sick leave 
Receives accident insurance 
Receives life insurance 
Log of  annual vacation days 
Log of  annual sick leave 
Log of  health insurance 
RZ 




-  .34 
(- 1.97) 
-  .12 
(- 30) 












-  .44 
(- 1.78) 
.01 















-  .34 
(- 1.46) 
-  .31 
(- 1.29) 

















-  .05 
(- .18) 










Source:  HIS data. 
"Prices, sites, experience, experience squared, and union status were also controlled for. 
receive sick leave, higher-wage women receive more. Sick leave may 
have greater importance for women  because of  greater  sickliness or 
because of their responsibilities for sick children. Whereas 5.1  percent of 
women employed full-time lost time from work due to illness in May 
1978, only 3.4 percent of men employed fully were absent from work in 
that month. This represented a loss of 2.8 percent of  working time for 
women and 2.1 percent for men, since men had lengthier absences for 
each incidence (Taylor 1979, p. 57). Table 11.3 also showed that women 
were significantly more likely than men to receive any sick leave. 
What the regressions suggest is that full-time employees can choose 
jobs with benefits or jobs without benefits, which are compensated at a 
higher rate. Thus workers can be thought of as regular employees receiv- 
ing benefits or as working on contract to provide certain services, without 
receiving benefits. However, among employees who receive benefits, the 
amount of  these benefits is positively related to wages. This may occur 
because an unobserved job tenure variable relates wages and benefits 
indirectly, or because the benefit is tied directly to wage levels. The LOB 386  Arleen Leibowitz 
reports, for example, that 63 percent of  the job-related  life insurance 
plans insure employees for a multiple of  their earnings rather than for a 
flat amount or one based on years of  service (U.S. Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics 1980a, p. 14). 
One of the most costly benefits is health insurance. The last column of 
table 11.5 presents some results using the smaller sample on which health 
insurance benefits are available in the HIS sample. The health insurance 
variable is a measure of the amount the employer paid for health insur- 
ance. There are only 136 observations for this regression because data 
were only available for a subsample of  HIS participants, and because 
workers who had changed jobs in the interval between the collection of 
health insurance data at baseline and the collection of  wage data in 1978 
were eliminated from the sample. Although the coefficients lack preci- 
sion due to the small sample size, it is clear that employer-paid premiums 
are positively rather than negatively related to wages. 
The rate of  return  to schooling for this subsample is 0.052  when 
benefits variables are not included in the regression, but increases to 0.07 
when benefits are included. However, the small sample size prevents any 
firm conclusions about bias. 
11.6  Conclusions 
Fringe benefits data from the HIS showed that there are significant 
differences by  sex and race in  the probability  of  receiving benefits. 
However,  there was little  evidence in  the multivariate  analyses that 
omitting benefits from earnings functions would systematically affect 
comparisons among sex or union groups. 
Hedonic wage equations showed that employees earned compensating 
differentials when benefits were not provided on the job.  However, 
among those receiving any benefits, the level of  benefits was positively 
related to wage rates. While both men and women who did not receive 
paid vacations have higher wages, men seem not to pay any significant 
price in terms of  lost earnings for receiving sick leave. Accident insurance 
affected wages insignificantly for both groups, perhaps because the total 
expenditure is small. Life insurance was positively related to wages. In 
the subsample  for  whom  health  insurance  data were  available,  the 
amount of  employer-paid premiums was positively related to wages. 
These results indicate that lack of  data on employee-specific taxable 
benefits does not greatly bias either rate of return estimates or earnings 
comparisons between  men  and women.  Accounting for marginal tax 
rates had a greater effect on rates of  return than accounting for fringe 
benefits. However, comparisons with LOB  employer supplied data show 
that it is nonetheless true that benefits vary with employee characteristics. 
For comparisons of  relative earnings, lack of benefits data does not seem 387  Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation 
crucial. However, the exclusion of nontaxable benefits, such as pensions, 
which rise more rapidly than taxable benefits with earnings, may pose a 
problem for relative earnings comparisons. While for relative wage com- 
parisons taxable fringe  benefits have  little  effect, for comparison  of 
absolute total compensation, ignoring benefits would lead to underesti- 
mates. 
The exclusion of  part-time  and seasonal  employees from  national 
benefits surveys may result in overestimates of fringe benefits coverage 
among workers.  One way employees may choose a package  of  low 
benefits is to choose to work part-time, since many employers pay ben- 
efits only to full-time employees. Thus, total compensation may have a 
discontinuity at the number of hours at which employees become eligible 
for benefits. 
More realistic models of labor supply should incorporate fringe ben- 
efits as part of the compensation for work and acknowledge explicitly  that 
hours worked respond to the discontinuity in compensation schedules 
due to providing fringe benefits only for full-time employees. The results 
presented here indicate that employees do trade off wages for the option 
to receive benefits. Surely this option affects hours of  work as well. 
Notes 
1. We assume six paid holidays per year, in order to compare HIS data to data in BLS 
(1980b). 
2.  The price index used is based on BLS data (US.  Bureau of Labor Statistics 1978) on 
the autumn cost of living for an urban intermediate family of four in 1975-78,  and on price 
data collected by the HIS. It is fully documented in Manning and Duan (1981). Only two of 
our sites (Dayton and Seattle) coincided with sitesused by BLS. Because the remaining  sites 
were not specifically reported in BLS data, in all sites we sampled prices for a subset of 
thirty-three items in the BLS list of more than four hundred items. The data for Dayton and 
Seattle, where both sets of  estimates were available, were used to calibrate HIS cost-of- 
living to BLS cost-of-living  estimates. The constructed indices were validated by comparing 
the HIS price index with data for available BLS sites (comparing  Fitchburg, Massachusetts, 
site with  Boston;  Franklin  County,  Massachusetts, with  Northeast  Nonmetropolitan; 
Charleston with Atlanta; Georgetown County, South Carolina, with Southern Nonmetro- 
polit an). 
3.  Since the two dependent variables are regressed on the same set of  independent 
variables, the appropriate test involves restricting some or all of the two sets of coefficients 
to be identical in the two regressions. The Fvalue is 4.12 for the education variable, with 1 
and 586 degrees of  freedom, which is significantly  different from zero at better than the 5 
percent level. An equivalent test involves regressing the differences between the  two 
dependent variables on the set of independent variables. Since the dependent variables are 
in logs, this is equivalent to the log of  the ratio 
In  W-In  V=ln -  =f(X,),  ( 3 
where Wand V are the wage rates and vacation days, respectively, and Xi  are the indepen- 388  Arleen Leibowitz 
dent variables. A significant education coefficient indicates the ratio of  wages to vacation 
falls with education, implying vacation rises more rapidly with education than wages do. 
4.  To estimate sick leave taken, as contrasted with the maximum entitlement reported in 
the HIS data, the mean number of  days of  sick leave taken by  male and female workers 
nationally was used (Taylor 1979, p. 51). Price adjustment was by means of  the price index 
described in note 1. Mean expenditures for life, health, and accident insurance in occupa- 
tions were calculated from BLS (1975) and matched by occupation to the sample data if the 
individual received such employer-paid insurance. 
5.  The test described in note 2 was used. The Fvalue was 0.71, with 8 and 586 degrees of 
freedom, which is not significant at the 5 percent level. It is, however, difficult to find 
significant  differences  when comparing  to the raw wage rate equation, which lacks statistical 
precision. 
6. The F value was 12.5 with 26 and 502 degrees of freedom. 
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Comment  B. K. Atrostic 
The other papers presented in this session (Burkhauser and Quinn, and 
Smith and Ehrenberg) show that estimation of  labor cost and trade-offs 
among wages, fringe benefits, and employment characteristics requires 
data on employer and employee characteristics, as well as detailed data 
on fringe benefit plans and expenditures, and information on personnel 
policies, such as mandatory retirement. Leibowitz appears to have, in the 
Health Insurance Survey (HIS), just such data. Demographic and eco- 
nomic data collected from households are matched with employer rec- 
ords of  fringe benefit expenditures. The importance of  having fairly 
complete measures of labor cost and worker characteristics can be high- 
lighted by laying out clearly the model whose hypotheses Leibowitz tests, 
and comparing her results with those obtained by estimating the same 
model with a data set which permits a more complete measure of labor 
cost. 
The wage and compensation equations relevant to Leibowitz’s inves- 
tigation can be stated formally as: 
(1)  1nW)  =AIX+el, 
(2)  ln(W+ BT)  = A2  X + e2, 
(3)  ln(W+B,+B,,)  =A3X+e3, 
where BT and BNT are taxable and nontaxable benefits, W is wages, and X 
is a vector of  pay determining characteristics (education, sex, region, 
etc.). Assuming  that  the X vector  and the  dependent  variables  are 
correctly specified and measured, a series of  hypotheses about the A 
vectors can be tested. If  taxable benefits are paid in proportion to wages, 
coefficients Al and A2  will be equal, except for the intercept. If  nontax- 
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able benefits are lower priced than taxable benefits, or if  the proportion 
of  nontaxable benefits in total compensation varies with elements of  the 
Xvector,A3  will not equalAl orA2.  Leibowitzframes the hypothesis that 
“employers can purchase nontaxable benefits which are worth more to 
their employees than an equivalent expenditure on wages,” and there- 
fore “higher proportions of  benefits at higher tax brackets” would be 
expected. The implied hypothesis tests are 
and 
Equations (2) and (3) are not estimated separately. Instead, the benefit 
measures in the HIS data (vacation and sick leave, and health insurance), 
described  as “largely taxable”  are combined with wages to form  an 
earnings variable,’ so that a limited form of  equation  (3) is actually 
estimated: 
(34  In (W + BT + B&-)  =  A30 X + e3a, 
where  BT is vacation  and sick  leave, and BGT  includes only health 
insurance (and no other nontaxable benefits). The hypothesis that cun be 
tested  by  comparing  coefficient estimates  in columns (1) and (5) of 
Leibowitz’s table 11.4 is thus: 
Ho: A1 = A3a. 
Additionally, Leibowitz tests the importance of  the nontaxability of 
most  benefits by  including the marginal and social security tax rates 
directly and estimating: 
(3b)  h[(W+  BT)(~  -  t)  + BNT]  =A3bX+ e3b, 
where (W + BT)  (1 -  t)  is after-tax income from wages and taxable ben- 
efits. Two hypotheses are tested: that A3b  is equal to A3, and that A36  is 
equal to A,: 
Ho: A1 =  A,,, 
&:  A36 =  A3. 
BsT rather than BNT is also used in estimating equation (3b) and its 
coefficients, A36. 
Estimates of equations (l),  (3a), and (3b) are presented in columns (l), 
(5),  and (6), respectively, of Leibowitz’s table 11.4. There is little differ- 
ence in coefficient estimates for union, sex, education, or experience 
variables between regressions where the dependent variable is wages, or 
ones where it is wages plus fringe benefits, or after-tax wages plus fringe 
benefits.  Leibowitz’s  empirical  results  support  the  hypothesis  that 391  Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation 
Al =  A36  = A30.  From this, she concludes that there is “little evidence” 
that  “omitting  benefits from earnings functions would  systematically 
affect  comparisons  among sex or union  groups,”  and therefore  that 
employee-specific benefit  data are not required for unbiased  rate of 
return, sex, or union comparisons.z She has not shown, however, that 
As equation (3a) makes clear, Leibowitz’s actual left-hand-side vari- 
ables for her columns (5)  and (6) are not those implied by equations (3) 
and (3b). Substantial benefit expenditure categories are omitted, notably 
pensions and legally required benefits (primarily employer contributions 
for social security, unemployment compensation, and workmen’s com- 
pensation). These two categories accounted for 15 percent of employer 
expenditures for employee compensation in 1977, or over half of the 23 
percent of compensation that was paid as benefits (US.  Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1980, table 1). This omission will be shown to have serious 
consequences for Leibowitz’s conclusions. 
Additionally, the hypothesis that workers in higher marginal tax brack- 
ets receive more of their compensation in the form of nontaxable fringe 
benefits, thus biasing estimates that use only wages or that fail to account 
for the differential taxability of different fringe benefits, cannot be tested 
with the HIS data and the above methodology. There is not enough data 
on major expenditure categories of nontaxable benefits, even were equa- 
tions (2) and (3) to be estimated separately. 
The effect of  the shortcomings of  the HIS data generally and of the 
benefits measures in particular is shown below, using estimates of  sex, 
union,  and  occupation  parameter  estimates  based  on  employer- 
employee exact match data from two BLS establishment surveys. Wages, 
sex, and union coverage are reported directly for individual workers in 
selected occupations in one survey, and fringe benefits expenditures for 
each worker  are calculated from the other ~urvey.~  These data were 
collected between 1976 and 1978, roughly the same span as the HIS data, 
collected from 1974 to 1978. Measures of education and experience are 
not collected in these data, but detailed occupational specifications give 
some indication of  relative human capital attainment. Alternative esti- 
mates of equations (l), (3), and (3a), using the BLS matched employer- 
employee data set, are reported in table C1l.l. Column (1) presents a 
regression using only wages as the dependent variable, as in equation (1). 
Column (2) presents a regression whose dependent variable corresponds 
to Leibowitz’s “wage plus fringe benefits” in column (5)  of her table 11.4; 
that is, the benefits portion of  compensation includes only sick leave, 
vacation, and life,  accident, and health insurance expenditures. This 
corresponds to equation (3a) above. Finally, column (3) reports a regres- 
sion whose dependent variable is expanded to include the other benefit 
categories available in the Employer Expenditure for Employee Com- 
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Table C1l.l  Full-Time Office Workers: Labor Cost Regressions (N  =  20544) 
In  (Labor  In  (Labor 
In  (Wage)  Cost,)  Cost,) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Union (office workers) 
Male 
Percentage female in 
Office workers as 
Part of  larger firm 
occupations surveyed 
percentage of  total 





















-  ,1142 










-  ,1095 
(.0112) 




















-  .0545 
(.0121) 













(  ,0070) 
-  .0187 
(.0093) 
- 
RZ  ,6973  ,7156  ,7077 
NOTES:  The regressions contain other occupation dummies, and also include industry and 
region dummies. See Atrostic (1983) for a detailed description of  the data. 
Labor Cost,  = Sum of  employer expenditures for each worker on wages, sick leave, 
vacation pay, and life, accident, and health insurance. Corresponds to “Wage plus benefits” 
in column (5),  table 11.4, in Leibowitz’s paper. Labor Cost,  = Sum of employer expendi- 
tures on all wages  and fringe benefits for which  data are collected in  the  Employer 
Expenditures for Employee Compensation Survey. Includes all fringe benefits in Labor 
Cost,,  plus pensions and legally required benefits. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
pensation data (primarily pensions and legally required benefits), corre- 
sponding to equation (3). These estimations do not exactly duplicate 
Leibowitz’s, as the data sets do not contain identical information about 
employer and employee characteristics, but the differences in empirical 
findings gonetheless are highly suggestive. 
A comparison of columns (1) and (2) yields results similar to Leibo- 
witz’s: the addition of  (selected) fringe benefits has little effect on esti- 
mates of  sex, union,  or occupational  differentials.  A  comparison of 
columns (1) and (3) or columns (2) and (3), however, yields quite differ- 
ent results. Male premiums remain  at about 4 per~ent.~  Union coef- 
ficients increase substantially from 8 to 12 percent. The discount associ- 393  Fringe Benefits in Employee Compensation 
ated with increasing the percentage of  females in the occupation falls 
from  12 to 6 percent.  Occupational  differentials narrow:  the system 
analyst premium decreases by about 9 percentage points, while the file 
clerk discount  decreases by  about 2 percentage points. Additionally, 
estimates of the effect of employer characteristics, such as establishment 
size, differ between specifications. Statistical tests of the hypotheses that 
Al = A3,  Al =  A3a,  andA3  =  A3a lead to rejection of these hypotheses at 
the 0.0001 level.’ Thus the completeness of benefits data included in the 
dependent variable  substantially alters estimates of  labor market dif- 
ferentials. Additionally, the adjusted R2  values in table C1l.l are higher 
for regressions using some measure of  fringe benefits in the dependent 
variable (this is also true of  Leibowitz’s table 11.4). 
Other problems with the data and analysis  in Leibowitz’s  paper suggest 
that its conclusions should be viewed with caution. The censoring prob- 
lem in the HIS study (a $25,000 income cutoff in 1973 dollars) is a liability 
for studying the effect of the differential taxability of fringe benefits. Her 
estimated union and sex differentials are not compared with those esti- 
mated elsewhere in the human capital or wage determination literature. 
Leibowitz does not include variables such as establishment size, occupa- 
tion, and industry, which have proven important in other studies. 
In conclusion, Burkhauser and Quinn show changes in estimated labor 
supply effects from expanding  the concept  of  labor cost.  Smith and 
Ehrenberg and Leibowitz fail to find expected differences in estimates of 
labor market parameters, and both results are attributable to the use of 
incomplete data. Consideration of the complete set of  benefits that are 
relevant to Leibowitz’s study makes the data recommendations of  this 
session unanimous: detailed employer-employee data are needed  for 
accurate estimates of  the determinants of  labor cost. 
Notes 
1. Although Leibowitz states in section 11.2.1 that health insurance expenditures  are not 
taxable, in section 11.5.2 she describes this group of  fringes as “largely taxable.”  Health 
insurance, one of  the “most costly” fringe benefit expenditures,  was about 4 percent of 
compensation in 1977, while sick leave and vacation pay comprise 6.9 percent of compensa- 
tion, according to the 1977 Employer Expenditures for Employee Compensation Survey 
(U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics 1980, table 1).  These three benefits are “largely taxable” 
only in the sense that 58 percent of  them are taxable. 
2.  What is meant, it would appear,  is that omitting raxable  benefits  does  not  bias 
comparisons, for these otherwise contradictory statements then follow: the “exclusion of 
nontaxable benefits . . . may pose a problem for relative earnings comparisons,”  and that 
“ignoring benefits would lead to underestimates.” Neither of  these statements is supported 
by the empirical results. 
3.  The data, and the Area Wage Surveys and Employer Expenditures for Employee 
Compensation Survey from which the data are derived, are described more fully in Atrostic 
(1983). 
4. The percentage is given by: exp(coefficient) -  1. 
5. The appropriate test for equality of  (some or all) parameters of regression equations 394  Arleen Leibowitz 
in which  alternative dependent variables are employed is described in Rao (1973, pp. 
543-56), and implemented in the SAS statistical package (SAS Institute Inc. 1981). Rao’s 
test assumes that the ratios of  the variances of  the residuals with respect to the various 
dependent variables are unknown.  Leibowitz’s test-entering the difference between 
alternative specifications as the dependent variable in a regression, and testing whether the 
coefficients thus estimated are equal to zero-is  correct for the case of  two alternative 
dependent variables. I am indebted to Richard J. McDonald for discussions on this point. 
For the data presented in this comment, both Leibowitz’s test and Rao’s test were 
applied, with essentially equivalent results: the hypotheses that Al =A3,  Al = AJa,  and 
A3  =  A30  should not be accepted. 
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